Federal Criminal Law and the Crime-fraud Exception: Disclosure of Privileged Conversations and Documents Should Not Be Compelled Without the Government\u27s Factual Foundation Being Tested by the Crucible of Meaningful Adversarial Testing by DiBiagio, Thomas M.
Maryland Law Review
Volume 62 | Issue 1 Article 4
Federal Criminal Law and the Crime-fraud
Exception: Disclosure of Privileged Conversations
and Documents Should Not Be Compelled
Without the Government's Factual Foundation
Being Tested by the Crucible of Meaningful
Adversarial Testing
Thomas M. DiBiagio
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thomas M. DiBiagio, Federal Criminal Law and the Crime-fraud Exception: Disclosure of Privileged Conversations and Documents Should




VOLUME 62 2003 NUMBER 1
© Copyright Maryland Law Review, Inc. 2003
Articles
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND THE CRIME-FRAUD
EXCEPTION: DISCLOSURE OF PRIVILEGED CONVERSATIONS
AND DOCUMENTS SHOULD NOT BE COMPELLED WITHOUT
THE GOVERNMENT'S FACTUAL FOUNDATION BEING




The attorney-client and work-product privileges protect against
the disclosure to the government of privileged conversations and doc-
uments prepared in connection with legal representation of corpora-
tions and individuals accused of being involved in criminal activity.
There is an exception to this protection. These privileges do not pro-
tect against the disclosure of privileged conversations or documents
that were intended to further a crime or cover up criminal activity.
When a client uses an attorney in such a manner, the federal courts
will apply the crime-fraud exception and compel disclosure.
During the course of a criminal investigation, the government
may uncover evidence indicating that a target has used an attorney to
further a crime or cover up criminal activity. The source of this evi-
dence typically arises from documentary evidence and statements
from cooperating witnesses. This evidence may include testimony
before the grand jury and documents produced in response to grand
jury subpoenas. The government may rely on this grand jury evidence
* United States Attorney for the District of Maryland. The view and opinions ex-
pressed in this Article are solely those of the author and do not reflect those of the Depart-
ment of Justice. The author wishes to thank Tonya Kelly for her editorial assistance.
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seeking to apply the crime-fraud exception and compel the disclosure
of privileged conversations and documents prepared in connection
with the target's legal representation.
The federal courts have universally held that, in order to preserve
the secrecy of ongoing grand jury proceedings, the government is not
required to disclose the portion of its submission that reflects evi-
dence obtained by the grand jury. Typically, the centerpiece of the
government's submission is drawn from evidence obtained by the
grand jury. The practical result is that the factual foundation is not
disclosed, and in turn, not subject to the crucible of meaningful adver-
sarial testing. Consequently, the district court is left to make a critical
determination that may result in the disclosure or taking of otherwise
privileged materials by relying on an incomplete or inaccurate factual
foundation.
In order for the crime-fraud exception to apply, there must be a
factual foundation sufficient to establish that a client used an attorney
to further a crime or cover up criminal activity. However, the current
practice does not adequately test the government's factual foundation
to support the application of the crime-fraud exception and subse-
quent compelled disclosure or taking of the privileged conversations
and documents. This practice undermines the proper functioning of
the adversarial system. Furthermore, the defendant's due process
rights under the Fifth Amendment militate heavily in favor of subject-
ing the government's factual foundation for the crime-fraud excep-
tion to meaningful attack by the defendant. The need to maintain the
secrecy of the grand jury proceedings should yield to preserving the
proper function of the adversarial process. Accordingly, if the govern-
ment seeks to compel the disclosure of privileged materials and elects
to rely on evidence obtained by the grand jury, the courts should dis-
close the government's evidence, disregard it, or impose a presump-
tion against the application of the crime-fraud exception.
I. EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES
A. Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege protects confidential conversations
and documents relating to the legal representation of a client.' The
purpose of this privilege is to promote full disclosure between an at-
1. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998) (refusing to compel
confidential oral communication between a lawyer and his client even after the client's
death); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403-04 (1976) (asserting that documents
transferred by a client to a lawyer for the purpose of obtaining legal advice are protected).
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torney and a client that, in turn, results in informed legal advice.2
Conversations and documents are protected under the attorney-client
privilege when: (1) the subject matter involves legal advice; (2) the
legal advice is sought from a licensed attorney; and (3) the parties
intend the conversations and documents to be confidential.' The at-
torney-client privilege is waived when the privileged information is dis-
closed to a third party.4
B. Attorney Work-Product Privilege
The work-product doctrine is broader than the attorney-client
privilege because the former can be asserted by both the client and
the attorney while the attorney-client privilege can be claimed only by
the client.5 Furthermore, the attorney work-product privilege shields
any notes or memoranda prepared by an attorney that reflect his legal
theories, research, opinions, or conclusions relating to his legal repre-
sentation of the client.6 Opinion work product benefits from an al-
most absolute protection that is only rarely defeated.7 Additionally,
the work-product privilege protects against the compelled disclosure
of facts developed by the attorney in connection with his representa-
tion of the client.8 In general, work product may only be compelled
"upon a showing of both a substantial need and an inability to secure
the substantial equivalent of the materials by alternate means without
undue hardship."9
2. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403.
3. In re Impounded, 241 F.3d 308, 316 n.6 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing In re Grand Jury
Empaneled Feb. 14, 1978, 603 F.2d 469, 474 (3d Cir. 1979)).
4. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 204 F.3d 516, 520 n.1 (4th Cir. 2000).
5. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 801 (3d Cir. 1979). Hereinafter, the
"work-product doctrine" may also be referred to as the "work-product privilege."
6. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947) (adopting the work-product privi-
lege to deter the development of "[i]nefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices [in litiga-
tion that] would inevitably develop" if a court compelled the disclosure of such
information); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, 574 (1st Cir. 2001) (providing that
"[t]he work product rule protects work done by an attorney in anticipation of, or during,
litigation from disclosure to the opposing party"). The work-product privilege originated
at common law, but Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) (3) now controls. In re Grand
Jury Subpoena, 220 F.3d 406, 408 (5th Cir. 2000).
7. Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 403 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, Thursday Special Grand Jury Sept. Term 1991, 33 F.3d 342, 348 (4th Cir.
1994)).
8. In reJohn Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1077 (4th Cir. 1981).
9. Chaudhry, 174 F.3d at 403 (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 33 F.3d at 348).
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C. Joint-Defense Privilege
The joint-defense privilege, also called the common-interest doc-
trine, precludes the disclosure of confidential conversations and docu-
ments between two or more clients and their attorneys where they are
involved in a joint-defense effort.'" In order to assert the privilege, a
party must demonstrate: "(1) that the communications were made in
the course of a joint defense effort; (2) the statements were designed
to further the effort; and (3) the privilege has not been waived."'1
While the joint-defense privilege on its own does not warrant any pro-
tection, it does operate as a caveat to the general rule that the attor-
ney-client privilege is relinquished when third parties become privy to
privileged information. 2 Thus, the exception permits parties to share
information that is pertinent to their joint defense, so that they can
benefit from full enjoyment of joint representation without concern
that the attorney-client privilege will be waived.
13
D. Act of Production Privilege
The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination protects an
individual from compulsory testimony and the production of personal
records that might tend to incriminate him. 4 Accordingly, an indi-
vidual may assert his Fifth Amendment right to decline to produce
documents, the contents of which are not privileged, where the act of
production is itself. (1) compelled; (2) testimonial; and (3) incrimi-
nating. 5 The Fifth Amendment privilege, however, does not protect
a corporation from being compelled to produce documents in re-
sponse to a grand jury subpoena on the grounds that the documents
10. In re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d 715, 719 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also United States v.
Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1392 (4th Cir. 1996) (describing the joint-defense privilege as an
expansion of the attorney-client privilege).
11. In re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d at 719; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563,
572 (1st Cir. 2001).
12. United States v. Agnello, 135 F. Supp. 2d 380, 382 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Sec.
Invest. Prot. Corp. v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 213 B.R. 433, 435 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997),
afffd, 2001 WL 792192 (2d Cir. July 10, 2001)); see also supra note 4 and accompanying text
(explaining the attorney-client waiver provision).
13. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d at 573. "A client who is part of a joint defense
arrangement, however, is entitled to waive the privilege for his own statements, and his co-
defendants cannot preclude him from doing so." Agnello, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 383. How-
ever, a defendant may not directly or indirectly reveal the privileged communications of
other participants. Id.
14. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 89-90 (1974). The "historic function" of the
right against self-incrimination has been to protect a "natural individual from compulsory
incrimination through his own testimony or personal records." Id (quoting United States
v. White, 332 U.S. 694, 701 (1944)).
15. Id.
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would incriminate the corporation.16 Thus, businesses and corpora-
tions are required to turn over all documents that are not privileged-
including incriminating documents.17
Likewise, under the "collective entity rule," officers and employ-
ees of the corporation cannot assert a personal Fifth Amendment
right nor decline to produce corporate documents in their possession
on the grounds that the documents would tend to be incriminating. 18
The reason for this is that official records and documents of an organ-
ization held by an employee in his representative capacity are not per-
sonal, and thus cannot be the subject of the personal privilege against
self-incrimination.19 Although a current employee is not entitled to
raise the Fifth Amendment as a shield against producing documents,
a mitigating evidentiary privilege exists to reduce the risk that the in-
dividual will incriminate himself in the course of producing such doc-
uments.2 ° Accordingly, the government is precluded from using the
compelled evidence against the individual.21
The issue that has remained unclear, until recently, was whether
former employees had the right under the Fifth Amendment to de-
cline to produce corporate documents in response to a grand jury
subpoena. The circuit courts of appeals are divided on this issue. The
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia have held that former employees do not
have such a right.22 Recently, however, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed the right of former officers and directors to
assert their Fifth Amendment act of production privilege to avoid the
compulsion of corporate documents in their possession. In the case
of In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum,2" the Government initi-
ated a grand jury investigation of a corporation and its employees for
16. Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 102 (1988).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 108-09.
19. See, e.g., Bellis, 417 U.S. at 90 (reasoning that "[s] ince no artificial organization may
utilize a personal privilege against compulsory self-incrimination .... it follows that an
individual acting in his official capacity on behalf of the organization may likewise not take
advantage of his personal privilege").
20. Braswell, 487 U.S. at 117-18.
21. Id. at 118.
22. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Nov. 12, 1991, 957 F.2d 807, 813 (11th Cir.
1992) (per curiam) (holding that former employees do not have a Fifth Amendment right
to decline to produce corporate documents in response to a grand jury subpoena regard-
less of the former employees' reasons for obtaining the documents); In re Sealed Case
(Government Records), 950 F.2d 736, 740-41 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (explaining that the Fifth
Amendment will not shield an employee from producing documents that contain both
personal and corporate information).
23. 191 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 1999).
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the alleged falsification of its records and misapplication of corporate
funds.24 During the course of the investigation, the corporation pled
guilty to falsifying its records and agreed to cooperate with the Gov-
ernment's investigation of individual employees. 25
Also during the course of the investigation, the Government is-
sued grand jury subpoenas requiring the corporation to produce doc-
uments. 26 After the subpoenas were issued and served, three
employees terminated their employment with the corporation.27 Two
of the three employees entered into a severance agreement, agreeing
to cooperate with the corporation and with any investigation that fol-
lowed.21 Upon learning that these employees had retained docu-
ments responsive to the grand jury subpoena, the Government served
grand jury subpoenas on these employees in their individual capaci-
ties. These three employees asserted their Fifth Amendment privilege
and refused to comply with the requests. 29 The Government moved
to compel production and asserted that the former employees re-
mained corporate custodians of those documents after they left the
corporation.3" The district court denied the Government's motion
and the Government appealed. 1
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower
court's decision and held that former employees of a corporation,
who have corporate documents in their possession, may assert a Fifth
Amendment privilege to refuse to respond to a grand jury subpoena
demanding those documents on the ground that the act of producing
the documents would be both testimonial and incriminating. 32 The
court recognized that although the contents of voluntarily prepared
records are not protected by the Fifth Amendment right against com-
pelled production, a person, in an act of producing a document, may
communicate information apart from its contents.3 3 As a conse-
quence, the communication may amount to compelled testimony and
should be protected.34
24. Id. at 174.
25. Id.




30. Id. at 176.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 183-84.
33. Id. at 178.
34. Id.
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The Second Circuit further held that once an officer or employee
leaves the company's employ, he no longer acts as a corporate repre-
sentative but functions in an individual capacity.35 The court rea-
soned that once the employment relationship terminates, the former
employee is no longer an agent of the corporation and is not a custo-
dian of the corporate records. 6 Therefore, the Fifth Amendment
protects an ex-employee from the disclosure of any records within his
possession since he would only be acting in his own capacity.3 7
II. CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION
The attorney-client, work-product, and joint-defense privileges do
not protect conversations and documents intended to further a crime
or cover up criminal activity." Under the crime-fraud exception, the
federal courts will compel the disclosure of privileged conversations
or documents prepared to further a crime or cover up criminal activ-
ity.39 As a consequence, when a lawyer is consulted, not with respect
to past wrongdoing, but rather for assistance in furthering criminal
activity, the privileges no longer apply and a grand jury may compel
testimony regarding privileged conversations and the production of
legal memoranda.4 °
The rationale for the crime-fraud exception is essentially the
same whether it is invoked against the attorney-client privilege or
35. Id. at 181.
36. Id
37. Id.
38. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989). The Zolin Court stated:
The attorney-client privilege is not without its costs .... [It] must necessarily
protect the confidences of wrongdoers, but the reason for that protection-the
centrality of open client and attorney communication to the proper functioning
of our adversary system ofjustice-ceas[es] to operate at a certain point, namely,
where the desired advice refers not to prior wrongdoing but to future wrongdoing.
Id. at 562-63 (citing 8J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2298, at 573 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)). Furthermore, the Court found that the purpose of the
crime-fraud exception is to ensure that the shield of secrecy does not apply to communica-
tions made to perpetuate the commission of a crime. Id. at 563; see also In re BankAmerica
Corp. Sec. Litig., 270 F.3d 639, 641 (8th Cir. 2001) (asserting that "the privilege protecting
attorney-client communications does not outweigh society's interest in full disclosure when
legal advice is sought for the purpose of furthering the client's on-going or future wrong-
doing"), cert. denied sub nom. Desmond v. BankAmerica Corp., 122 S. Ct. 1437 (2002).
39. See Zolin, 491 U.S. at 563 (describing the crime-fraud exception); see also United
States v. Rakes, 136 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1998) (asserting that "the attorney-client privilege is
forfeited... where the client [seeks] the services of [his] lawyer to enable or aid the client
to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud").
40. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir. 1979) (concluding that
the crime-fraud exception permits the disclosure to the grand jury of material protected by
the work-product privilege).
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work-product protection." In either case, a client has no legitimate
interest in seeking legal advice to further a crime or conceal criminal
activity.42 Moreover, the attorney's knowledge of the client's fraud
does not control whether the crime-fraud exception vitiates the attor-
ney-client and work-product privileges.43 The central factor that de-
termines the applicability of the crime-fraud exception is whether the
client used the attorney to further a crime or cover up criminal
activity."
The circuit courts of appeals have adopted various, yet similar,
requirements with respect to the elements necessary to sustain the ap-
plicability of the crime-fraud exception. Typically, to invoke the
crime-fraud exception, the government must establish, by clear and
convincing evidence or probable cause, the following two elements:
(1) that the client target was committing or intended to commit a
crime; and (2) that the client target's attorney was used to further that
crime, or conceal the criminal activity.4 5 The Courts of Appeals for
the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits follow this two-part test for the
application of the crime-fraud exception.4 6 If both of these elements
41. Id.
42. See id. (noting that privileges tend to hinder the truth-seeking function of a court;
therefore, they should be narrowly construed). In contrast to the attorney-client privilege,
work-product protection applies to both the client and the attorney, either of whom may
assert it. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 43 F.3d 966, 972 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
Consequently, an innocent attorney (i.e., one who was not aware of the client's illegal
activities) may invoke work-product protection even if a prima facie case of crime or fraud
has been made as to the client. Id. n.5; see also In re Special Sept. 1978 GrandJury, 640 F.2d
49, 63 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding that when an attorney asserts the work-product privilege,
factual information communicated to the attorney must be disclosed, but opinion work-
product may be withheld). Therefore, a potential difference exists in the application of
the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege and work-product protection.
For example, even if the crime-fraud exception prevents the client from asserting the attor-
ney-client and work-product privileges, the attorney could still enjoy work-product protec-
tion, so long as the attorney is unaware of the client's crime or fraud. In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 43 F.3d at 972.
43. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 43 F.3d at 972.
44. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 102 F.3d 748, 750-51 (4th Cir. 1996).
45. E.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 223 F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 2000).
46. See In re Impounded, 241 F.3d 308, 316 (3d Cir. 2001) (embracing the two-part test
to invoke the crime-fraud exception); United States v. Jacobs, 117 F.3d 82, 87 (2d Cir.
1997) ("A party wishing to invoke the crime-fraud exception must demonstrate that there
is a factual basis for a showing of probable cause to believe that a fraud or crime has been
committed and that the communications in question were in furtherance of the fraud or
crime."); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 102 F.3d at 751-52 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding that an
attorney's unwitting assistance in covering up a criminal or fraudulent activity still allowed
for the invocation of the crime-fraud exception where the two elements had been
satisfied).
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia requires the government to prove:
(1) that "the client made or received the otherwise privileged communication with the
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are satisfied with respect to a subpoenaed document or testimony, the
government may compel the production of that document or
testimony.47
The Fifth Circuit has held that the government must establish two
elements to invoke the crime-fraud exception.48 First, there must be a
prima facie showing of a violation "sufficiently serious" to defeat the
privilege.49 Second, there must be "some valid relationship between
the [documents] under subpoena and the prima facie violation."5 If
both of these elements are satisfied with respect to a subpoenaed doc-
ument or testimony, the government may compel the production of
that document or testimony.5
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has held that to in-
voke the crime-fraud exception, the party challenging the protection
must proffer prima facie evidence that the charge of attorney partici-
pation in the criminal or fraudulent conduct is grounded in fact.
52
The evidence presented must demonstrate that the client was en-
gaged in or planned to engage in a crime or fraud when it sought the
relief of an attorney, whose assistance was procured in furtherance of
the criminal or fraudulent behavior or was closely connected to it.
53
III. CASE LAW APPLICATION OF THE CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION
A. Introduction
A defendant has a right to a fair opportunity to defend against a
charged offense.54 In its most basic form, this means that in order to
adequately safeguard liberty interests, due process requires that the
government's submission "encounter and survive the crucible of
meaningful adversarial testing" before privileged conversations are re-
intent to further an unlawful or fraudulent act[; and] (2) that the client actually carried
out the crime or fraud." In re Sealed Case, 223 F.3d 775, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal
quotation marks omitted); In re Sealed Case, 107 F.3d 46, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
47. In re Impounded, 241 F.3d at 318;Jacobs, 117 F.3d at 87; Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174
F.3d 394, 403-04 (4th Cir. 1999).
48. See In re Int'l Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir. 1982).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1242-43. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also held in In re Interna-
tional Systems & Controls Corp., that proof of specific intent of the client to further a crime
or fraud with the assistance of an attorney is necessary to establish a prima facie case. Id. at
1243.
52. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 144 F.3d 653, 658 (10th Cir. 1998).
53. Id.
54. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 63 (1996) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating
that "[d]ue process demands that a criminal defendant be afforded a fair opportunity to
defend against the State's accusations").
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vealed or a legal memorandum disclosed.55 But the critical question
remains whether this principle applies to the investigative phase.
Typically, criminal investigations are initially targeted at individu-
als and corporations. During the course of an investigation, however,
the government may uncover evidence implicating the involvement of
an attorney in the crime or in covering up the criminal activity. This
evidence may indicate that an attorney directly participated in the
criminal activity or that the target used the attorney to cover up the
crime and obstruct the investigation. This evidence typically arises
from statements of cooperating witnesses and from documents.56
Such evidence may include testimony before the grand jury and docu-
ments obtained as a result of grand jury subpoenas.5 v
In response to this evidence, the government may seek to
broaden the scope of its criminal inquiry to include the attorney as a
target, subject, or witness. The government may serve a subpoena re-
quiring the attorney to testify before the grand jury regarding pro-
tected attorney-client communications. The government may also
serve a grand jury subpoena on the attorney and his law firm requir-
ing the attorney or law firm to produce all legal memoranda prepared
by the attorney in connection with his representation.5" The prosecu-
tor may believe that these privileged materials either implicate the cli-
ent in criminal activity or supply the "last link" in an existing chain of
incriminating evidence likely to lead to the client's indictment. 9
In a criminal investigation involving an individual, the govern-
ment is precluded by the Fifth Amendment from compelling the tar-
55. Id. at 66 (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690-91 (1986)); see also infra
notes 183-185 and accompanying text (describing the procedural due process
requirements).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Reeder, 170 F.3d 93, 105-06 (1st Cir. 1999) (describing an
attorney's testimony at trial that led to his client's indictment).
57. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 144 F.3d at 656-57 (considering a case in which
both privileged documents and testimony were validly sought by a grand jury).
58. The United States Attorneys Manual allows the Assistant Attorney General for the
Criminal Division to issue grand jury or trial subpoenas to attorneys for information relat-
ing to the representation of a client. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL tit. 9-13.410(A).
59. The standard for admitting otherwise privileged documents at trial under the
crime-fraud exception is "a prima facie showing that the attorney's assistance sought was in
furtherance of a crime or fraud." Reeder, 170 F.3d at 106; see also United States v. Neal, 27
F.3d 1035, 1048 (5th Cir. 1994) (requiring that the government make a prima facie show-
ing that the client hired the attorney to advance criminal conduct in order to invoke the
crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege); United States v. Davis, 1 F.3d 606,
609 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying the prima facie standard to admit privileged testimony at
trial, but stating that the party trying to use the exception need not present the level of
evidence required to win the point in litigation); United States v. Horvath, 731 F.2d 557,
562 (8th Cir. 1984) (applying a prima facie standard to allow evidence that legal advice
had been obtained in furtherance of illegal activity).
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get to testify before the grand jury,6 ° but the Fifth Amendment does
not preclude the government from seeking to compel the target's at-
torney to testify before the grand jury.6 1 The Fifth Amendment does
protect against the compelled production of personal papers. 62 How-
ever, the government is not precluded by the Fifth Amendment from
seeking to compel the production of business records, including an
attorney's legal memoranda. 63 The attorney-client and work-product
privileges, however, do prohibit the government from seeking to com-
pel an attorney to testify and produce legal memoranda. 64 As a conse-
quence, if the target's attorney refuses to testify or produce
documents pursuant to the attorney-client and work-product privi-
leges, the government may seek to apply the crime-fraud exception to
compel disclosure.65
In a criminal investigation involving a corporate target, the Fifth
Amendment does not afford the same protections. The government
is not precluded by the Fifth Amendment from compelling the pro-
duction of legal memoranda from the corporate target, or testimony
from the corporate target's employees or attorneys. 66 However, the
attorney-client, work-product, joint-defense, and act of production
60. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15. The Fifth Amendment provides that
"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment applies only when an accused individual is
compelled to make a testimonial communication that is incriminating. Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976).
61. "There is no constitutional right not to be incriminated by the testimony of an-
other.... The privilege against self-incrimination is solely for the benefit of the witness
and is purely a personal privilege of the witness, not for the protection of other parties." In
re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 144 F.3d at 663 (quoting United States v. Skolek, 474 F.2d 582, 584
(10th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (citations omitted)). The Fifth Amendment prohibits the
government from making an individual incriminate himself or herself, but it does protect
information solely because of its private nature. Id
62. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 91 (1974) ("We have recognized that the
Fifth Amendment [protection] ... includes an individual's papers and effects," as well as
compelled oral testimony). Because the act of complying with a government subpoena
may be testimonial of the existence, possession, or authenticity of the thing produced, such
a production may implicate Fifth Amendment rights. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410-11 (holding
that the act of producing tax documents prepared by an accountant would not involve
incriminating testimony because the documents belonged to the accountant and the gov-
ernment knew that the documents existed).
63. Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 102 (1988).
64. See supra text accompanying notes 1-9 (describing the protections that the attorney-
client and attorney work-product privileges offer).
65. See supra Part II (describing the crime-fraud exception, generally).
66. See Braswe, 487 U.S. at 102, 108-09; see also United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612
(1984) (holding that the contents of voluntarily prepared business records are not
privileged).
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privileges may preclude the government from compelling testimony
and the production of documents.
In an attempt to obtain information, the government will initially
seek the disclosure of protected conversations and documents pursu-
ant to a grand jury subpoena.67 If the target or the target's attorney
refuses to comply and relies on the attorney-client or work-product
privilege for protection, the government may seek to apply the crime-
fraud exception to compel testimony and the production of legal
memoranda. If the government's submission relies on grand jury
materials, that portion of the government's submission will be submit-
ted ex parte.68 In response to a motion seeking disclosure of an ex
parte submission, the courts have universally held that, in order to
preserve the secrecy of ongoing grand jury proceedings, the govern-
ment is not required to disclose grand jury evidence relied on by the
government in support of the application of the crime-fraud excep-
tion.69 Thus, the target and the target's attorney are denied a fair
opportunity to inspect and rebut the government's submission and
must respond without knowing the factual foundation relied on by the
government.70 Moreover, the district court is forced to make a fact
intensive determination based on an untested record.
B. Case Law
In United States v. olin,71 the Supreme Court established the
threshold showing required prior to a court's in camera review of al-
legedly privileged documents. 72 The Court held:
Before engaging in [an] in camera review [of privileged docu-
ments] to determine the applicability of the crime-fraud ex-
ception, the judge should require a showing of a factual basis
adequate to support a good faith belief ... that in camera
review of the materials may reveal evidence to establish the
claim that the crime-fraud exception applies.7"
67. See UNITED STATES AT-ORNEYS' MANUAL tit. 9-13.410(B) (describing the recom-
mended strategy for compelling disclosure). However, the United States Attorneys' Manual
instructs Department of Justice attorneys to first make "all reasonable attempts" to acquire
the information before resorting to a subpoena. Id.
68. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 568 (1989) (allowing parties to use in cam-
era review to establish the crime-fraud exception).
69. E.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena as to C97-216, 187 F.3d 996, 998 (8th Cir. 1999).
70. See id.
71. 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
72. Id. at 572.
73. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The Supreme Court provided the content, but not the contours, re-
garding the nature of the government's initial ex parte submission.
The circuit courts of appeals, however, have universally held that in
order to preserve the secrecy of ongoing grand jury proceedings, the
government is not required to disclose grand jury evidence relied on
in support of the government's application of the crime-fraud
74exception.
In the case of In re Grand Juiy Subpoena as to C97-216,75 the target
was initially charged with a drug trafficking offense. 76 The court sub-
sequently dismissed the indictment due to the unavailability of two
anticipated witnesses." The Government thereafter commenced a
grand jury investigation regarding the target's role in the witnesses'
disappearances. The Government subpoenaed the attorney who had
represented the target in connection with the initial charge to testify
before the grand jury.7' The attorney in response filed a motion to
quash the subpoena based on the attorney-client privilege. The Gov-
ernment moved to apply the crime-fraud exception and compel the
testimony.79 In support of its motion, the Government delivered to
the court a sealed ex parte affidavit and attachments. The district
court granted the Government's motion and found that although
there was no evidence of wrongdoing by the attorney, there was clear
and convincing evidence that the target had used the attorney to fur-
ther his criminal activity.80
The target appealed and argued that the district court's reliance
on the ex parte affidavit violated his due process rights because he was
precluded from challenging the Government's assertion.8 ' The Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected this argument, maintaining
the holdings of numerous courts of appeals allowing a court to con-
sider the Government's ex parte evidence in order to maintain the
privacy of ongoing grand jury proceedings, thus rejecting the appel-
lant's due process argument.8 2
74. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena as to C97-216, 187 F.3d at 998 (discussing recent
cases requiring only that the government make an in camera submission to assess the
crime-fraud exception, and not an adversarial hearing).
75. Id. at 996.





81. Id. at 997-98.
82. Id. at 998. In order to support this proposition, the court cited In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, Thursday Special Grand Jury September Term, 1991, 33 F.3d 342, 350-53 (4th Cir.
1994); In reJohn Doe, Inc., 13 F.3d 633, 636 (2d Cir. 1994); In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805
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In the investigation known as In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Thursday
Special Grand Jury September Term, 1991, 3 the Government initiated a
grand jury investigation of two corporations.8 4 One of the target cor-
porations was served with a subpoena.8 5 While the target corporation
offered some responsive documents, it failed to produce certain re-
sponsive documents asserting attorney-client and work-product privi-
leges. 6 The target corporation's law firm was then served with grand
jury subpoenas.8 7 The target corporation instructed the law firm not
to produce any documents based on the attorney-client and work-
product privileges."8 In response, the Government filed a motion to
compel compliance and argued that any privilege was abrogated be-
cause the target corporation had used the law firm to further its crimi-
nal conduct.8 9 In support of the application of the crime-fraud
exception, the Government provided the court with an ex parte sub-
mission that primarily consisted of grand jury documents and testi-
mony. The target was denied access to the submission.9 ° The district
court granted the Government's motion to compel and the target cor-
poration appealed.91
On appeal, the target corporation argued that the district court
denied it its due process rights by failing to disclose the Government's
submission and prohibiting it an opportunity to refute the allega-
tions.9 2 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed and
affirmed the district court's ruling. The appellate court first held that
the Government had met its evidentiary burden of establishing a
prima facie case that the client used the law firm to further a criminal
scheme and that the testimony sought was highly relevant to the ongo-
ing investigation before the grand jury. The court next held that in
camera proceedings were appropriate to protect the ongoing
investigation.9"
F.2d 155, 164-68 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 723 F.2d 1461, 1467 (10th Cir.
1983); and In reJohn Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 489-91 (2d Cir. 1982).
83. 33 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 1994).
84. Id. at 344.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 344-45.




92. Id. at 349.
93. Id. at 352-53 (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 884 F.2d 124, 126 (4th Cir.
1989)).
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In In reJohn Doe, Inc.,94 the attorney for the target received a sub-
poena to testify before the grand jury regarding confidential conversa-
tions with the target.95 The attorney refused to comply; thus, the
Government sought an order applying the crime-fraud exception and
compelling the testimony.96 In support of the order, the Government
provided the district court with an ex parte affidavit of an FBI agent.97
This submission set out the factual basis for the application of the
crime-fraud exception."
The target and the target's attorney objected to the ex parte sub-
mission and requested that the district court disclose the contents of
the FBI affidavit.99 Because of the need to preserve grand jury se-
crecy, the district court denied the request. The district court then
reviewed the Government's submission and concluded that the crime-
fraud exception should be applied and the target's attorney should be
questioned. 00
The target and the target's attorney appealed and argued, inter
alia, that the district court's failure to disclose the Government's sub-
mission was fundamentally unfair.10 1 The target and the target's attor-
ney also argued that the inability to inspect and rebut the evidentiary
submission also violated their due process rights. 102 The Second Cir-
cuit rejected this argument and affirmed the lower court's ruling.103
The appellate court held that the necessity of preserving the secrecy
of the grand jury proceeding precluded the disclosure of the Govern-
ment's submission.104 The court recognized that an in camera sub-
mission "deprive [s] one party to a proceeding of a full opportunity to
be heard on an issue, and its use is justified only by a compelling inter-
est."105 However, the court noted that an in camera submission is ap-
propriate when it is the only way to resolve a dispute without
compromising necessary grand jury secrecy. 10 6 The court did, how-
ever, recognize as an exception to the rule that in certain circum-
94. 13 F.3d 633 (2d Cir. 1994).






101. Id. at 636-37.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 638.
104. Id. at 637.




stances a legitimate need for adversarial examination may arise in
which the judge may permit limited access to the Government's
submission.
10 7
In In re Grand Jury Subpoena,1 °8 the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit considered a target corporation that was the subject of a two-
year federal investigation regarding possible tax and fraud viola-
tions. 10 9 The attorney representing the target for more than a year in
connection with the investigation was subpoenaed before the grand
jury as a witness. The subpoena required the attorney to testify and
produce documents." 0 The attorney moved to quash the grand jury
subpoena, arguing that the disclosure of responsive testimony and
documents would compromise privileged attorney-client and work-
product matters. The attorney also claimed that his client's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel would be violated by the compelled testi-
mony because the testimony would bar the attorney from the
presentation. "'
The court permitted the client target to intervene and the client
target asserted the same arguments." 2 The Government, which had
previously provided the attorney with an affidavit that generally out-
lined the subject matter of the grand jury investigation, submitted a
second affidavit. The Government provided the second affidavit ex-
clusively to the district court to establish the applicability of the crime-
fraud exception. This affidavit detailed the subject matter of the
grand jury investigation along with documents and testimony ob-
tained during the investigation.' 13 The target client and the attorney
requested a copy of this second affidavit. They argued that without
access, they could not effectively respond to the Government's at-
tempt to establish the crime-fraud exception." 4 After a hearing, the
district court denied the motion and directed the attorney to
testify- 115
The district court found that the second affidavit: (1) adequately
described the grand jury investigation; (2) adequately showed that the
attorney's testimony would be relevant to this investigation; (3) ade-
quately set forth the basis for invocation of the crime-fraud exception;
107. Id.
108. 223 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2000).
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and (4) did not indicate that the testimony was sought for an im-
proper purpose." 6 The court further found that the disclosure of the
second affidavit would compromise the secrecy of the investigation.
The target corporation appealed and argued that it was "unfair
and inequitable" for the district court to apply the crime-fraud excep-
tion without affording it a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's
allegations.117 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected
the target corporation's argument and affirmed.11 The court rea-
soned that investigative proceedings are not adversarial, and thus the
determination as to whether to apply the crime-fraud exception could
be "adjudicated" based solely on the undisclosed allegations set forth
in the government's factual submission.119
The Third Circuit articulated the following reasons for protecting
grand jury secrecy:
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be
contemplated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the
grand jury in its deliberations . .. ; (3) to prevent suborna-
tion of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may tes-
tify before [the] grand jury and later appear at trial... ; (4)
to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons
who have information with respect to the commission of
crimes; (5) to protect [the] innocent [from the stigma of a
grand jury investigation]. 120
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit then concluded that the
need for secrecy in the grand jury compelled the rejection of the at-
torney's claim to disclose the affidavit. 12' The court, however, did rec-
ognize the need to test the factual foundation of the Government's
submission, but was satisfied that the district courts would "vigorously
test the factual and legal bases for any subpoena." 2 2 In response to
the attorney's Sixth Amendment right to counsel argument, the court
held that the target corporation could not claim that its right to effec-
116. Id.
117. Id. at 217.
118. Id. at 220.
119. Id. at 216. The court explained that "[t]he grand jury may generally 'compel the
production of evidence or testimony of witnesses ... unrestrained by the technical[,] pro-
cedural[,] and evidentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials.'" Id. (quoting
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974)).
120. Id. at 218 (quoting United States v.John Doe, Inc. I, 481 U.S. 102, 109 n.5 (1987)).
121. Id. at 219.
122. Id. However, the court did not state how such vigorous testing would take place
absent a response from the opposing party.
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tive assistance of counsel was infringed because that right does not
attach until criminal proceedings are initiated. 123
In In re Grand Jury Subpoena,124 the target corporation was issued a
federal grand jury subpoena in connection with an investigation of
possible violations of the Clean Air Act.125 In response, the corpora-
tion unintentionally released a legal memorandum, drafted in-house,
implicating in-house counsel in an attempt to cover up the alleged
criminal activity.' 26 The target corporation and its in-house counsel
sought the return of the memorandum but the Government re-
fused.' 27  The district court denied a motion for return of the
memorandum.128
Based on the content of the disclosed legal memorandum, the
Government moved for production of all documents prepared in the
course of a corporate environmental compliance investigation. The
documents were produced directly to the district court.' 29 After re-
viewing the documents in camera, the district court found that the
documents were protected by the attorney-client privilege and as-
sumed that they were protected by the work-product privilege.'3 0 The
Government argued that the documents in question revealed that the
target corporation used its in-house counsel to conceal from state and
federal regulators the extent of its noncompliance with the environ-
mental regulations.'' The district court agreed and held that the
crime-fraud exception applied. The corporation was then ordered to
turn over the documents in its possession to the Government.13 2 The
target corporation refused.' 3
The district court then held the corporation in contempt and im-
posed a fine.33 Both the district court and the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit refused to stay the fine pending appeal. The corpo-
123. Id. at 220.
124. 220 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2000).
125. Id. at 407.
126. See id. (finding that the Government, in response to receiving the memorandum,
moved for the production of over two-hundred documents prepared by the target's coun-





131. See id. (finding that the memorandum gave sufficient evidence to over two-hundred
other documents implicating the target).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 407-08.
134. Id. at 408. The court fined the corporation a penalty of $200,000 per diem, begin-
ning the subsequent day. Id.
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ration was forced to produce the documents. 135 The district court re-
fused the in-house counsel's motion to issue an order returning the
documents to him in order to gain an appealable contempt order.
The in-house lawyer subsequently appealed.136 After the corporation
produced the documents, the grand jury issued subpoenas compel-
ling two outside consultants, retained by the target corporation to as-
sist in its environmental compliance investigation, to testify to their
interactions with in-house counsel. The in-house counsel and the cor-
poration moved to quash the subpoenas. The district court denied
the motion to quash, and reiterated the court's prior crime-fraud
analysis. The target corporation and in-house counsel appealed.1"7
On appeal, the in-house counsel argued that he had a legally
valid interest in preserving the confidentiality of the documents inde-
pendent of the corporation's interest. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit stated that, as a general rule, the scope of the work-prod-
uct privilege extends to an in-house counsel.13 However, in this case,
because the documents were prepared for the intended use and bene-
fit of others within the corporation and were not prepared for the
exclusive benefit and use of the in-house counsel, the court held that
there was no basis for finding that justice would be compromised if
the grand jury allowed the examination of the corporation's docu-
ments.' 3 9 Accordingly, the in-house counsel had no standing to assert
the work-product privilege.
140
The target corporation challenged the district court's application
of the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client and work-product
privileges.' In response, the appellate court first recognized that the
crime-fraud exception could overcome the privilege where communi-
cation or work product was meant to further ongoing or future fraud-
ulent or criminal activity.' 42 The Fifth Circuit then recognized that
the Government has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie
case that the attorney-client relationship was intended to further crim-




138. Id. The court stated that "this circuit has held that an innocent attorney may in-
voke the work-product privilege even if a prima facie case of fraud or criminal activity has
been made as to the client." Id. (citing In re GrandJury Proceedings, 43 F.3d 966, 972 (5th
Cir. 1994)).
139. Id. at 409.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 410.
142. Id. (referencing United States v. Dyer, 722 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1983)).
143. Id.
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fenses may exist precluding findings of fraud or criminal
environmental violations, the possibility of a defense does not estab-
lish that the lower court abused its discretion and committed revers-
ible error.
144
In In re Sealed Case,'4 5 the federal grand jury subpoenaed the law-
yer who served as general counsel for the Republican National Com-
mittee (RNC) in connection with an investigation regarding possible
violations of the federal election laws and, specifically, the repayment
of various loans made to an independent think tank.'4 6 The lawyer
refused to produce a number of documents claiming that the attor-
ney-client and work-product privileges applied. The Government's
motion to compel the RNC's compliance was granted by the district
court, which held that the privileges were subject to the crime-fraud
exception.1 47 The RNC appealed and the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia reversed.' 48 The Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia held that the crime-fraud exception was inapplica-
ble because the accusations against the RNC were not criminal in
nature. 149 Therefore, there was no underlying crime or fraud to sup-
port the application of the exception. 5 °
In In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 5' several hospitals, doctors, and
others were the target of an ongoing federal grand jury investigation
regarding possible health care fraud violations.' 52 In connection with
that investigation, documents were produced to the Government that
implicated the use of two attorneys by the hospital and corporate of-
ficers to carry out criminal conduct. 5 ' As a result, the grand jury is-
sued subpoenas requesting that the two attorneys testify before the
grandjury. The attorneys, the hospital, and a corporate officer moved
to quash the subpoenas because of the attorney-client and work-prod-
uct privileges.' 5 4 In addition, the hospital argued that forcing its at-
torneys to testify would violate its Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.' 55 The Government responded by arguing that the crime-
144. Id.
145. 223 F.3d 775 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
146. Id. at 777.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 779.
150. Id.
151. 144 F.3d 653 (10th Cir. 1998).
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fraud exception vitiated the privileges. 156 In support, the Govern-
ment filed an ex parte statement of the evidence describing the crimi-
nal activity allegedly undertaken by the lawyers and the hospital.
157
The district court found that because the Government had estab-
lished a prima facie case that the target had engaged in criminal or
fraudulent behavior furthered by the assistance of counsel, the crime-
fraud exception applied. 5 Accordingly, the trial court denied the
motion to quash. The court also refused to permit the targets to view
the statement of evidence. 1 9 The attorneys then appeared before the
grand jury but refused to answer any questions.16 ° The Government
moved to compel and filed additional ex parte evidence with the dis-
trict court setting forth evidence implicating the attorneys in the crim-
inal activity.16 The district court again found that the crime-fraud
exception applied and granted the Government's motion.1 6 2 The dis-
trict court granted a stay of the order and the hospital appealed.'
63
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed and held
that the Government established a prima facie case that: (1) the
targets had been engaged in criminal conduct; (2) they engaged the
legal services of counsel in furtherance of that criminal conduct; and
(3) their attorneys knew of the criminal conduct.' 6 4 The court also
rejected the argument that the district court should have disclosed the
Government's submission of prima facie evidence. 6 5 The Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the authority of the district
court to decide this issue based on ex parte materials is:
grounded in the importance of a properly functioning grand
jury .... [a] ny holding that would saddle a grand jury with
minitrials and preliminary showings would assuredly impede
its investigation and frustrate the public's interest in the fair
and expeditious administration of the criminal laws. Moreo-
ver, the reasons for keeping a tight lid on in camera docu-
ments containing grand jury testimony and on evidence
156. Id. at 656-57.
157. Id. at 657.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. Each attorney claimed the attorney-client and work-product privileges, as well




164. Id. at 660-61.
165. See id. at 662 (explaining that the court was well within its discretionary powers
when it decided not to disclose the government's ex parte evidence).
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gathered during criminal investigations are legion and
obvious. 1 66
The court also rejected the corporate officer's Fifth Amendment
challenge. 6 v The corporate officer claimed that the two target attor-
neys should have been allowed to assert a Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination on his behalf.168 The court held that there
is no constitutional right against incrimination by the testimony of an-
other. 169 Since the Fifth Amendment protects against compelled self-
incrimination, and not the disclosure of private information, 7 ° a
party is not privileged from external or independent production of
evidence.171 Therefore, the ultimate question was whether the evi-
dence was obtained through self-incriminating compulsion, as op-
posed to whether it was private.172 The court recognized that under
certain circumstances the attorney could not be compelled to pro-
duce documents protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege.1 73 The
court reasoned that because the information sought was the content
of oral statements voluntarily made by the corporate officer, there was
no compelled disclosure under the Fifth Amendment. 174
In In re Impounded,175 the Government issued several subpoenas
calling for the production of documents involving the target's busi-
ness. 176 While the target's attorney responded by producing several
documents, the Government deemed the response inadequate and re-
quested the production of additional documents. 177 The attorney re-
plied by representing that several of the requested documents did not
exist. The Government followed up its request by advising the attor-
ney that it intended to call him before the grand jury and examine the
attorney about the effort made to respond to the subpoena. The at-
torney then responded by producing some additional documents
such as canceled checks and check ledgers.178
166. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
167. Id. at 663.
168. Id.
169. Id. The court explained, "the privilege against self-incrimination is solely for the
benefit of the witness and is purely a personal privilege of the witness, not for the protec-
tion of other parties." Id.
170. Id. (referencing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 (1976)).
171. Id. (referencing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 399).
172. Id. (referencing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 396).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. 241 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 2001).
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The Government issued a second grand jury subpoena for docu-
ments relating to the target's business. 79 The attorney again re-
sponded that the documents responsive to the subpoena did not exist.
Over the next several months, the Government issued three addi-
tional subpoenas calling for the production of documents. In re-
sponse, the attorney produced a few documents, but again
represented that many of the documents responsive to the subpoena
did not exist.18 °
A search warrant was then executed at the target's business and
residence.'8 1 The search resulted in the discovery of numerous docu-
ments responsive to the Government's prior grand jury subpoenas
that the attorney had represented did not exist.182 In response, the
Government subpoenaed the attorney to testify before the grand jury
and indicated that it intended to inquire about the effort made to
respond to the prior grand jury subpoenas. The attorney invoked the
attorney-client privilege and refused to testify. The Government filed
a motion to compel testimony claiming that the attorney had ob-
structed justice and therefore, the crime-fraud exception invalidated
any privilege asserted. 8 3 The district court denied the Government's
motion and summarily ruled that it would be "fundamentally unfair"
to compel the attorney to testify.'1 4 Accordingly, the Government
appealed. 185
On appeal, the Government argued that it had submitted suffi-
cient evidence indicating that the target had used the attorney to con-
ceal criminal activity warranting the application of the crime-fraud
exception. 186 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed
and held that the district court's failure to engage in an analysis of the
Government's submission and the application of the crime-fraud ex-
ception warranted reversal and remand.1 8 7 The appellate court in-
structed the district court to first examine the evidence and determine
whether the application of the crime-fraud exception was war-
ranted.' 8 Absent a finding that the target used the attorney to cover
up criminal activity, the attorney could legitimately invoke the attor-
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 311-12.




186. Id. at 317.
187. Id. at 317-18.
188. Id.
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ney-client privilege in response to the grand jury subpoena. 8 9 For
these reasons, the case was remanded to the district court to deter-
mine whether the Government had submitted sufficient evidence of
the intent to obstruct justice and determine whether this evidence
supported a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.1 90
C. Due Process Requires an Adversary Hearing
In seventeenth-century England, the Court of Star Chamber pre-
pared the evidence for unspecified charges in advance of trial, giving
defendants little opportunity to reply or defend. 9 ' Although not as
striking, the present process for applying the crime-fraud exception
similarly casts the prosecutor in the role of the architect of the pro-
ceeding. The reluctance of the district courts to provide the target
and the target's attorney with the government's factual foundation re-
lied on by the government to invoke the crime-fraud exception, un-
fairly lightens the government's burden of proof and unnecessarily
evades the crucible of an adversary proceeding.
The Fifth Amendment includes both procedural and substantive
due process requirements.19 2 The substantive due process compo-
nent precludes the government from engaging in conduct that
"shocks the conscience," or "interferes with fundamental rights im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty."1 93 Procedural due process
requires that a person not be deprived of a protected interest without
notice and an opportunity for a hearing "at a meaningful time and in
189. Id. at 318.
190. Id.
191. See Laurence A. Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court's Voluntariness Doc-
trine in Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 76 (1989) (explaining that defendants
had only eight days to answer a complaint in writing). In fact, the Court of Star Chamber
possessed a particularly oppressive political tool because it had legislative, executive, and
judicial powers. Id.
192. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides, "[n]o person shall ...
be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
193. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (quoting Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)). Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit explained,
'substantive due process is violated if either (1) the government actor deprived the plain-
tiff of an identified interest in life, liberty or property protected by the Fifth Amendment,
or (2) the government actor's conduct 'shocks the conscience.'" Aversa v. United States,
99 F.3d 1200, 1215 (1st Cir. 1996). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit provides a
slightly different formulation of substantive due process:
To succeed on its substantive due process claim [claimant] must show that (1) it
has a liberty or property interest; (2) the state deprived it of this liberty or prop-
erty interest; and (3) the state's action "falls so far beyond the outer limits of
legitimate governmental action that no process could cure the deficiency."
United States v. Safety-Kleen, Inc., 274 F.3d 846, 862 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Sylvia Dev.
Corp. v. Calvert County, 48 F.3d 810, 827 (4th Cir. 1995)).
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a meaningful manner." '194 To determine the specific dictates required
to ensure due process, three factors must be considered:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safe-
guards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the
... administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.' 9 5
These factors weigh in favor of disclosing the government's factual
foundation and affording a target a fair opportunity to rebut the gov-
ernment's submission prior to the district court's determination to ap-
ply the crime-fraud exception and compel the disclosure of privileged
materials.
1. Private Interest.-The due process protection afforded by the
Fifth Amendment extends to fundamental liberty and property inter-
ests. 196 The property interest here is straightforward. There should
be a legitimate property and liberty interest in maintaining the confi-
dentiality of documents and conversations protected by the attorney-
client and work-product privileges.
The Fifth Amendment liberty interest protection extends to "inti-
mate associations. "197 This protection guarantees an individual the
choice of entering an intimate relationship free from undue intrusion
by the government.1 98 While this protection at a minimum extends to
family relationships, 99 whether it extends to other relationships de-
pends on the degree to which the characterization of those relation-
ships resembles characteristics of family relationships.2"' Intimate
relationships or associations protected by the Fifth Amendment are
194. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S.
545, 552 (1965)).
195. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see also United States v. Farmer, 274
F.3d 800, 803-04 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying the Mathews due process formula to determine
whether the defendant should be afforded an adversary hearing to assess whether he could
use his government seized assets to fund his defense); United States v. Michelle's Lounge,
39 F.3d 684, 697-701 (7th Cir. 1994) (using the Mathews due process test to decide that the
claimant must be given an adversary hearing in a civil forfeiture case).
196. See Safety-Kleen, Inc., 274 F.3d at 862.
197. See Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984) (stating that "inti-
mate human relationships" are protectable as a "fundamental element of personal lib-
erty"); see also Sanitation & Recycling Indus., Inc. v. City of New York, 107 F.3d 985, 995-96
(2d Cir. 1997) (describing distinct types of constitutionally protected associations).




deliberate, exclusive, and selective. Accordingly, the Supreme Court
has held that:
[O] nly relationships with these sorts of qualities are likely to
reflect the considerations that have led to an understanding
of freedom of association as an intrinsic element of personal
liberty.... Determining the limits of state authority over an
individual's freedom to enter into a particular association
therefore unavoidably entails a careful assessment of where
that relationship's objective characteristics locate it on a
spectrum from the most intimate to the most attenuated of
personal attachments. 20 1
The attorney-client privilege falls within the "spectrum" of inti-
mate associations deserving of constitutional protection. This confi-
dential relationship is distinguished by its intimacy and selectivity
throughout the affiliation. The attorney-client privilege is intended to
foster unfettered communication between attorneys and their clients
so that the attorney may provide fully informed legal advice and
thereby promote broader public interest in the observance of the law
and administration of justice.20 2 Similarly, the purpose of the work-
product privilege is to allow counsel to analyze, prepare, and advocate
effectively without "unnecessary intrusion."2" 3 Accordingly, the Fifth
Amendment protection afforded to liberty and property interests
should extend to confidential conversations and documents protected
by the attorney-client and work-product privileges.
2. Risk of an Erroneous Deprivation.-The application of the
crime-fraud exception results in the permanent taking of the privi-
lege.20 4 Under the present practice, any question regarding the ade-
quacy of the factual foundation to support the application of the
crime-fraud exception arises after the lawyer is compelled to testify
and produce legal memoranda. 5 Thus, the failure to subject the
government's submission to meaningful adversarial testing prior to
disclosure poses a substantial risk of error.
201. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620. While discussing the spectrum of intimacy, the Court
noted, "[w] e need not mark the potentially significant points on this terrain with any preci-
sion. We note only that factors that may be relevant include size, purpose, policies, selec-
tivity, congeniality, and other characteristics that in a particular case may be pertinent." Id.
202. In re Richard Roe, Inc., 68 F.3d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1995); Upjohn Co. v. United States,
449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); see also supra text accompanying notes 1-4 (illustrating the attor-
ney-client privilege).
203. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947); see also supra notes 5-9 and accom-
panying text (discussing the work-product privilege).
204. See, e.g., United States v. Farmer, 274 F.3d 800, 804-05 (4th Cir. 2001).
205. Id.
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A myriad of situations can arise from the government's unilateral
assertion of the crime-fraud exception that can undermine the district
court's finding. For example, although an attorney's testimony and
memoranda may support the government's assertion that a target was
involved in criminal activity, the evidence might not support the gov-
ernment's assertion that the target used the attorney to further a
crime or cover-up criminal activity. In fact, the evidence may under-
mine it. For example, one of the witnesses who testified in a grand
jury and whose testimony was relied on in the government's submis-
sion might have testified falsely. Or, the government may subse-
quently uncover material evidence that undermines its submission. As
a consequence, the inferences and conclusions drawn by the govern-
ment would have been wrong. Therefore, a sufficient foundation in
fact would never have existed to support the application of the crime-
fraud exception.
In such a case, the government has caused a permanent and ir-
revocable taking of the privilege without an adequate factual founda-
tion. As a consequence, all of the privileged conversations and
documents that the district court ordered to be produced would be
tainted and all of the evidence derived from that would be similarly
tainted. The taint of the government's constitutional transgressions
could infect every part of the investigation and prosecution of the de-
fendant. There would be no means other than dismissal of the indict-
ment to remedy the due process violation. 20 6 At that point, the
attorney would have been tarred with innuendo and the government's
entire prosecution against the target unnecessarily put in jeopardy.
At issue is both the accuracy of the determination to apply the
crime-fraud exception and the credibility of the criminal process. Any
risk to these interests could have all been avoided by: (1) the govern-
ment confining the factual foundation in its submission to witness in-
206. The evidence would have been impermissibly obtained in violation of the defen-
dant's Fifth Amendment due process rights. United States v. Marshank, 777 F. Supp. 1507,
1518 (N.D. Cal. 1991) ("[A] defendant's remedy for prosecutorial misconduct in the pre-
indictment stage is provided in the due process protection of the Fifth Amendment.").
Thus, the exclusionary doctrine applies to any incriminating evidence obtained contrary to
a defendant's Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights under the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine. Id at 1519 n.l. Suppression of the evidence is generally the proper remedy for
a Fifth Amendment violation. Nevertheless, dismissal of the indictment is proper where
suppression of the evidence cannot remedy prejudice from the constitutional breach. Id
at 1521-22. The deliberate and direct use of privileged evidence in violation of the defen-
dant's Fifth Amendment due process right would compel the dismissal of the indictment.
See United States v. Pelletier, 898 F.2d 297, 303 (2d Cir. 1990) (granting the defendant a
new trial because the Government's use of evidence at trial was obtained in violation of the
defendant's due process rights).
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terviews and documents obtained outside the grand jury; or (2)
testing the government's submission and factual foundation by the ad-
versarial process. Accordingly, the process should be recalculated and
repositioned from its current state. If the government seeks to apply
the crime-fraud exception, breach a privilege, compel the disclosure
of privileged conversations and documents, and then elect to rely on
grand jury materials, the courts should either disclose the govern-
ment's grand jury evidence, disregard it, or apply a presumption
against disclosure. The need to maintain the secrecy of the grand jury
proceedings should yield to the need to subject the government's sub-
mission to meaningful adversarial testing, prior to compelling the pro-
duction of privileged testimony and documents.
20 7
3. Government's Interest and Administrative Burden.-Requiring
the disclosure of the government's submission neither disrupts the
government's power of investigation nor makes the prosecution's ap-
plication of the crime-fraud exception so cumbersome as to rarely be
worth the effort. Disclosure only affects the timing of the govern-
ment's submission and its investigative strategy. Disclosure of the fac-
tual foundation simply reinforces the government's effort to gather
the facts and marshal the evidence with incredible industry. If the
government does not want to disclose the grand jury evidence, the
government is free to rely on evidence obtained outside the grand
jury or the prosecution can delay its submission until after the target is
indicted. Moreover, the proposed practice would not intrude on the
grand jury, create procedural detours or delays, or impede the institu-
tional independence of the grand jury.
CONCLUSION
A defendant has the right to a fair opportunity to defend against
a charged offense. This principle should apply to the investigative
phase and the district court's determination to apply the crime-fraud
exception.2 °s More precisely, in response to the government's motion
to apply the crime-fraud exception, the only way to afford a target a
fair opportunity to defend itself is to require that the government's
unilateral submission and factual foundation encounter and survive
207. In addition, there is no analogy between the government's unilateral effort to seek
a search warrant and to apply the crime-fraud exception. Without a specific inclusion and
justification, typically a search warrant does not permit the seizure of privileged
documents.
208. See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 228 F.3d 341, 348 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that in
a criminal case a subpoena to testify or produce documents before a grand jury com-
mences an adversary process).
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the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing. Currently, the govern-
ment's submission is where the discussion ends, but this is where the
discussion should begin. The basic purpose of this proposed change
neither compromises nor obstructs grand jury investigations, but
rather preserves the integrity of the judicial system and the successful
development of the truth. There is a fine line between zealous advo-
cacy and complicity in a crime." ° This fine line compels a special
need for adversary examination.
The importance of maintaining secrecy of the grand jury is ac-
knowledged. However, the fairness and integrity of the fact-finding
process is of equal concern. The current practice of withholding the
disclosure of the core factual assertions set forth in the government's
submission impedes that process. Under the present process, there is
a risk of erroneous deprivation of the target's interest in the absence
of any adversary hearing.
Requiring a meaningful adversary hearing comports with the
overriding purpose of the attorney-client and work-product privi-
leges-to encourage proper functioning of the adversarial system.
Moreover, the paramount value that our criminal justice system places
on protecting privileged conversation and documents should out-
weigh the government's interest in preserving the secrecy of the grand
jury proceedings, an interest that the prosecution has chosen to place
in jeopardy. The failure to subject the government's submission to
the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing may distort the record,
mislead the fact finder, and undermine the central truth-seeking func-
tion of the courts. It may also undermine the fairness, integrity, and
the public's perception of the criminal process.
209. See United States v. Abbell, 271 F.3d 1286, 1304 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)
(reinstating a lawyer's conviction based on complicity with drug trafficking organization).
